Chapter 1

On December 19, 1991, by decree of President Boris Yeltsin, by merging two departments - the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Agency - the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs of the RSFSR (MBVD) was formed. The head of the new ministry was immediately appointed.

"Nezavisimaya Gazeta" reported that this decree caused a sharply negative reaction in the Russian parliament and accusations against Boris Yeltsin of trying to "establish an authoritarian regime in the republic." This decision was opposed by four main committees of the Supreme Council: on legislation, on law and order, on human rights and on security.

A group of deputies of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR sent a petition to the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR (CC) - they demanded that the presidential decree on the formation of the MBVD be recognized as inconsistent with the Constitution of the RSFSR. As the "Izvestia" newspaper wrote, this was the "first public hearing" in the newly formed Constitutional Court. On 14 January 1992, "after 8 hours of deliberation and more than 2 hours of deliberation behind closed doors", the judges ruled in favor of the applicants.

The Constitutional Court noted that, according to the Constitution of the RSFSR, the Councils of People's Deputies, the Congress of People's Deputies of the RSFSR, and the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR are vested with the right to form ministries. It is also up to the legislature to determine the structure of the Council of Ministers.

The president of the RSFSR also had the right to independently decide on issues of reorganization of the executive authorities, but these powers were given only for the period of radical economic reform. And, in any case, the president was obliged to submit a draft decree to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

"The Supreme Soviet cannot be excluded from resolving these issues, and the President of the RSFSR, being the head of the executive branch, has no right to limit the constitutional powers of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR as a body of legislative power," the Constitutional Court's judgment says.

Moreover, the Constitutional Court stressed that according to the law, combining the functions of the departments of internal affairs and state security is allowed only when a state of emergency is introduced and only in the form of an operational headquarters. Moreover, such a decision is also made exclusively on behalf of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR.

The Constitutional Court also pointed out that the presidential decree on the creation of a united ministry does not correspond to the concept of judicial reform approved by the Supreme Council, which provided for the separation of operational-search functions and the investigation, that is, the organizational separation of the investigative apparatus from the structures of the prosecutor's office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Federal Security Agency (KGB).

The Constitutional Court concludes that Boris Yeltsin, by issuing a decree on the creation of a new ministry, exceeded his authority. According to the court decision, the Decree of the President of the RSFSR of December 19, 1991 No. 289 "On the formation of the Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs of the RSFSR" was recognized as inconsistent with the Constitution of the RSFSR in terms of the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers established in the Russian Federation, as well as the delineation of competence between the highest bodies of state power and administration of the RSFSR.

Since the entry into force of this decision of the Constitutional Court, the decree itself and all normative acts based on it have lost their legal force and are considered invalid.

Judge Ernest Ametistov considered that the presidential decree on the formation of the MBVD was adopted to ensure the stability of the system of state authorities during the period of radical economic reform. "This conclusion was confirmed during the meeting of the Constitutional Court of the RSFSR both by the representative of the President of the RSFSR, and by a number of expert opinions, testimonies and documents presented," the text of the dissenting opinion says.

At the same time, the judge recognized that the decree contradicted a number of laws of the RSFSR. For example, the creation of a "powerful super-ministry", according to Ametistov, contradicts the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, which provides for the disintegration of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the transfer of many of its powers to other bodies.

After the court recognized the presidential decree on the creation of a unified Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs as unconstitutional, the Kremlin was forced to abandon this idea. Sergey Shakhrai, who then served as Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation and oversaw the Federal Security Agency and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, said: "The decision of the Constitutional Court is not legal, but political. But the government must obey."

The head of the policy department at "Vedomosti", Dmitry Kamyshev, called this decision of the Constitutional Court one of those that "influenced the course of Russian history." "Separation of the functions of state security and protection of public order, experts believe, is one of the elements of the system of checks and balances, without which the stable functioning of the rule of law is impossible," "Izvestiya" wrote in the news about the recognition of the decree as invalid.

A group of people's deputies of the RSFSR appealed to the Constitutional Court because of three decrees issued by the first president of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin and deciding the fate of the Communist Party. According to the parliamentarians, the documents on the suspension of the activities of the Communist Party, the property and activities of the Communist Parties of the RSFSR and the CPSU were adopted in an unconstitutional way.

The deputies believed that when promulgating them, Boris Yeltsin violated one of the basic democratic principles of the separation of powers, intruding into the sphere of authority of the legislative and judicial branches. In their appeal to the Constitutional Court, they noted that the suspension of the activities of a public association is possible only in a state of emergency, which did not exist at the time the relevant decree was issued, and therefore the President of the Russian Federation exceeded his powers.

Boris Yeltsin's decrees were issued against the background of the August actions of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), which put forward demands on General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Mikhail Gorbachev to introduce a state of emergency in the country or transfer power to Vice President Gennady Yanaev. The Central Committee of the CPSU and part of the local party committees supported the activities of the State Emergency Committee, which violated one of the first decrees of Boris Yeltsin as president - "On the termination of the activities of the organizational structures of political parties and mass social movements in state bodies, institutions and organizations of the RSFSR". The document forbade the CPSU and its local branches to interfere in the activities of state institutions. The decree on the property of the party imposed a ban on transactions with what belonged to the party and its subdivisions.

The last document, which the deputies disputed, was published already in November and gave a more detailed assessment of the activities of the CPSU by Boris Yeltsin as a whole: "The events of August 19-21 [1991] highlighted with all obviousness the fact that the CPSU was never a party. It was a special mechanism for the formation and implementation of political power by merging with state structures or their direct subordination to the CPSU. The leading structures of the CPSU carried out their own dictatorship, created a property basis for unlimited power at the state expense."

During the preparation for consideration of the complaint, the Constitutional Court received petitions from people's deputies who had the opposite point of view - they insisted that the decrees issued by Boris Yeltsin were constitutional, but the organizations themselves - the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR - were not. In total, more than a hundred deputies participated in the constitutional process.

Almost twenty years later, in an interview with Novaya Gazeta, the judge of the Constitutional Court Gadis Gadzhiev said that in this case "the decision was largely dictated by political reasons": "It was not born only from legal logic. The feeling was that if we take a radical path and recognize as criminal not only the structures of the CPSU, but the entire party, then this, together with their family members, will be a very large part of society. And this will cause a serious split in society. I didn't want to rock the boat, and we had to look for some kind of reconciling solution."

The "conciliatory decision" turned out to be the recognition by Boris Yeltsin of a lawful decree on the dissolution of the structures of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR.

The Constitutional Court noted that the governing structures of these associations "appropriated state power and actively exercised them, preventing the normal activities of constitutional authorities", which became "the legal basis for the liquidation of these structures by decree of the highest official of the Russian Federation": "Actions of the President were dictated by the objective need to eliminate a possibility of a return to the previous situation, to exclude the structures whose daily practice was based on the fact that the CPSU occupied a position in the state mechanism that was not consistent with the foundations of the constitutional order."

The Constitutional Court classified the paragraphs of the decree on the dissolution of primary organizations created on a territorial basis as unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court left the property issue for consideration by arbitration courts.

The judges did not at all evaluate the constitutionality of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR, referring to the fact that it is impossible to assess the constitutionality of what no longer exists: in August-September 1991, the CPSU actually disintegrated and lost the status of an all-union organization.

The "reconciling" decision of the Constitutional Court, namely its clause on the possibility of restoring the activities of the primary cells of the party, allowed Gennady Zyuganov to recreate, register and subsequently develop the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF).

Three judges disagreed with the general decision and expressed dissenting opinions.

Anatoly Kononov considered that the division into primary "public" organizations and "leading structures of the CPSU" is not correct in order to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of the organization as a whole. In his opinion, it is unfair and unlawful to lay responsibility for all decisions of the CPSU only on a "narrow group of communist functionaries," as the Constitutional Court did in its decision: "They [primary organizations] as the basis of the party acted in accordance with the general line of the CPSU, not only unanimously approved all unconstitutional decisions and activities of the leading structures of the CPSU, but actively promoted them and, using the same methods, means, ideas, executed them, relying on party, disciplinary influence, in necessary cases involving the repressive apparatus of law enforcement agencies." Because of this, according to Kononov, the clause of Yeltsin's decree on the dissolution of primary organizations should be considered constitutional.

The judge also did not agree with the refusal to consider the petition on the unconstitutionality of the CPSU itself, noting that enough materials were collected in the process (including "reliable evidence of the CPSU's gross violations of a large number of constitutional norms and current legislation") to make any decision on this issue. : "The evasion of resolving a petition to verify the constitutionality of the CPSU and its component part - the Communist Party of the RSFSR is, in essence, a denial of justice, since no other body will ever again be able to give a competent legal assessment of the state-legal side of this phenomenon, which had a total impact on the entire political, economic and social system of Russia for many decades. Kononov himself was convinced that the CPSU could be qualified as a criminal organization.

Judge Viktor Luchin, in a dissenting opinion, did not agree with the possibility of interpreting the president's powers on the basis of the "residual principle": "Having assumed the responsibility to decide the fate of the party, the President of Russia, in essence, appropriated discretionary power based on the predominance of expediency over legality, and in order to achieve this goal, he used measures and sanctions against a political party that were not provided for by law." According to the judge, the contested documents were adopted in violation of the principle of separation of powers, in excess of authority and inappropriate subject.

Due to the refusal to consider the petition for the constitutionality of the CPSU, according to Luchin, "it was possible to avoid a deep politicization of the process" and "to make a decision that is largely balanced, taking into account the "expectations" of society and other circumstances in the case, but at the same time contradictory in its constitutionally legal grounds and consequences". Among them, Luchin noted "a compromise, situational nature", and the decision itself, in his opinion, "absorbed elements of political expediency, and not just legal validity."

Judge Boris Ebzeev, in the most voluminous of three opinions, wrote that the activities of the governing bodies of the CPSU as of November 30, 1992 cannot be recognized as constitutional, "but this does not mean that the executive branch has the right, at its own discretion, to take restrictive measures against such a public association, they are possible in our country by a court decision. To recognize a party as unconstitutional, it was necessary to study a number of fundamental theoretical and practical criteria, which the Constitutional Court did not do in its judgment.

A group of people's deputies appealed to the Constitutional Court with a demand to declare one of the norms of the resolution on holding a referendum unconstitutional – the norm was adopted at the extraordinary Congress of People's Deputies in March 1993. The popular vote was supposed to put an end to the political crisis provoked by the conflict between the two branches of government. The Russians were asked four questions. They were:

1. Do you trust the President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin?
2. Do you approve of the socio-economic policy pursued by the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation since 1992?
3. Do you consider it necessary to hold early presidential elections in the Russian Federation?
4. Do you consider it necessary to hold early elections of people's deputies of the Russian Federation?

In part 2, clause 2 of the resolution, it was stated that decisions on all four issues would be considered adopted if more than half of the citizens who have the right to be included in the voting lists vote for them. The initiators of the proceedings insisted that such a procedure for counting votes in a referendum is required only for issues of adopting, amending and supplementing the Constitution. And since the questions proposed for the referendum, according to the authors of the appeal to the Constitutional Court, were not among those, positive decisions on them should be made if more than half of those who came to the polling stations vote for them.

The Constitutional Court declared the norm unconstitutional in terms of summing up the voting results on the first two issues, but did not find inconsistencies with the Constitution on issues 3 and 4. The court considered that the first two questions of the referendum - on confidence in the president and approval of the economic policy of the government - are not of a legal, but of a moral, evaluative and political nature, and therefore a decision on them should be made taking into account the percentage of votes from the citizens who came to the polling stations. The decision on the 3rd and 4th issues, which decided the fate of early elections, is, in the opinion of the court, of a constitutional nature, and it should be taken by a majority vote of the total number of voters.

Judge of the Constitutional Court (now retired) Tamara Morshchakova pointed out that by its decision the Constitutional Court actually recognized that an affirmative answer to the third and fourth questions (on the need for early elections of the president and parliament deputies) predetermines the introduction of amendments and additions to the Constitution. However, the issues submitted to the referendum, according to the judge, were not formulated "as related to the change in the Constitution." According to the law "On the Referendum of the RSFSR", on issues not related to the adoption, amendment and addition of the Constitution, a decision at a referendum is considered adopted if more than half of the citizens who participated in the vote voted for it. Having introduced a different procedure for summing up the results of the referendum, the congress, as indicated in the dissenting opinion, adopted a resolution that was contrary to the Constitution and the law on the referendum. According to Morshchakova, the congress had no right to change the procedure established by the Constitution and the law "On the referendum of the RSFSR" for its holding.

Judge Ernest Ametistov also concluded that the questions 3 and 4 submitted to the referendum "do not belong to the category of issues of adoption, amendment and addition to the Constitution", therefore, decisions on these questions should be considered adopted if more than half of the citizens who took part in the voting vote for them, in accordance with the Referendum Law. The judge came to the conclusion that the norm that became the subject of the proceedings was contrary to the Constitution.

As a result of the referendum campaign, a slogan was born that reflected the results of the will of citizens and later became famous - "Yes-yes-no-yes": citizens answered in the affirmative to all questions, except for the third - about the need for early presidential elections. However, 50% of the votes from the total number of voters, as required by the resolution challenged in the Constitutional Court, were not collected for the early elections of the president and people's deputies.

It was because of this principle of counting votes that the chance to resolve the crisis through a referendum was lost. There were no legitimate grounds for the early termination of the legislature of the acting Supreme Council, and in October 1993 this was done by force. However, in the same year, a new Constitution was adopted with enhanced presidential powers and a bicameral parliament. Elections to the State Duma and the Federation Council were held. The political and legal assessment of the results of the referendum is inseparable from the assessment of the events that unfolded after it and the constitutionality of the actions of the conflicting parties.

"This is such an illustrative case of how the Constitutional Court can arrange the largest political crisis, and a better example cannot be found," Tamara Morshchakova comments on this case 30 years later. "The conflict would have been settled if simultaneous new presidential and parliamentary elections had been held. New legislatures of presidential and parliamentary power would have begun. And the people would have participated in this, choosing those whom they wanted. The best way to resolve any political conflicts is through elections. Not a shooting, of course, and not an impeachment of the president, of course, and not a new president spontaneously proclaimed at the request of the parliament, of course.

But there was no democratic settlement of the situation, and the opposition of state bodies intensified. Everything that followed, by no means a peaceful course of events, was the result of this decision of the Constitutional Court, which turned out to be fatal. Now no one pays much attention to it, but it changed the situation for the worse: then it was a direct path to conflict, and it was drawn precisely by the Constitutional Court."

The reason for the consideration was the request of the Murom City People's Court (Vladimir Region), which was in the process of a civil case on the claim of the "Krasny Luch" Joint-Stock Company against A.N. Kuznetsov. For the theft of several electricity meters, the latter was sentenced to two years in prison. "Krasnyy Luch", being the owner of the house, in one of the apartments of which the convict lived, demanded that he be recognized as having lost the right to use the living quarters.

The fact is that the provisions of Part 1 of Art. 60 of the Housing Code of the RSFSR provided that the dwelling (if it is not the private property of the tenant) is retained by the temporarily absent tenant for only six months. At the same time, paragraph 8 of part 2 of the same article contained an additional condition according to which housing for those sentenced to deprivation of liberty for a term of more than six months was retained only until the sentence was carried out.

Similar complaints were received by the Constitutional Court from several more citizens - E.R. Taknova, E.A. Ogloblin and A.N. Vashchuk, who on the same grounds at various times were recognized as having lost the right to use housing. And since the cases concerned the same subject, the CC joined them in one proceeding.

All contested norms of the Housing Code of the RSFSR were found by the Constitutional Court to be inconsistent with the Constitution.

The decision states that the Basic Law proclaims the person's rights and freedoms the highest value, and the restriction in them can be established "only to the extent necessary to protect the foundations of the constitutional order, morality, health, rights and legitimate interests of others ensuring the defense of the country and the security of the state". The provisions of Art. 60 of the Housing Code, as the Constitutional Court considered, do not meet these requirements, and the temporary absence of the tenant or members of his family in the dwelling does not threaten the listed values.

The Constitutional Court also pointed out that the mere temporary absence of a person in the provided housing, including in connection with his conviction to imprisonment, cannot be regarded as improper performance by the tenant of his housing duties, as well as the basis for depriving him of the right to use it.

Moreover, as the Court found, the norm violates the constitutional rights of a person to free movement, choice of place of stay and residence, as well as the right to housing, which no one can be deprived of arbitrarily. The norm also introduces an additional punishment not provided for by criminal law in the form of deprivation of housing, which in fact is discrimination on the basis of a criminal record.

As a result, the Murom City Court was obliged to proceed when deciding on the case of A.N. Kuznetsov from the position reflected in the ruling issued by the Constitutional Court. The cases of the other applicants were also subject to revision, and the contested articles of the Housing Code were declared invalid.

Disagreement with the decision of the Constitutional Court in a dissenting opinion was expressed by Judge Yuri Danilov. He stated that the provisions of the Housing Code under consideration still do not contradict the Constitution "both in their content and in their meaning."

Yuri Danilov considered that the loss by a citizen of the right to a specific housing does not entail the loss of the constitutional right to housing, since he can realize it again "at any moment". At the same time, the judge drew attention to Part 1 of Art. 40 of the Constitution, which prohibits not "any", but only "arbitrary" deprivation of a citizen's right to housing.

Judge Danilov also clarified that a citizen who occupies a particular dwelling may lose the right to it "due to various circumstances": such as, for example, by a court judgment on the confiscation of home ownership, due to the impossibility of living together with him or moving to another permanent place of residence and etc. Serving a sentence in places of deprivation of liberty, according to the judge, cannot be considered a "good reason" for absence from a dwelling. On the contrary, the judge called these "actions" "abuse of one's rights", since the residential premises are intended "for permanent residence of citizens", and failure to comply with this condition not only "discredits" its purpose, but also violates the rights and legitimate interests of other persons, and in the first place - the owners of residential premises.

"The Constitutional Court drew attention to the fact that single citizens sentenced to deprivation of liberty are automatically deprived by the housing authorities of the residential premises of which they were tenants, which is a violation of a number of constitutional rights - the right to freedom of movement, the right to housing and freedom from discrimination," says lawyer Alexander Peredruk. "It may seem that this Judgment of the Constitutional Court has mattered only for those sentenced to deprivation of liberty, but in reality it has been important for the whole society.

The penitentiary system should be aimed at the resocialization of criminals. Obviously, after release, a citizen needs to find a job, which is unlikely to happen instantly. If, in addition to this, he encounters the problem of lack of housing, then these difficulties may become an incentive to return to the search for illegal sources of livelihood, that is, they will return him to a criminal path, which essentially eliminates the meaning of the previous punishment. Therefore, the decision of the Constitutional Court can be fully called protecting both the private interest (of a certain category of persons) and the public one."

A group of deputies of the State Duma sent a request to the Constitutional Court to check the government's decree on the disarmament of illegal armed formations on the territory of the Chechen Republic and President Boris Yeltsin's decree on military doctrine for compliance with the Basic Law.

Later, the Federation Council also sent its request to the Constitutional Court - the number of disputed acts increased to five, but all of them, according to the applicants, constituted "a unified system of normative legal acts and led to the misuse of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation", which was legally possible only within the framework of state of emergency or martial law. The disputed documents preceded the entry of the Russian armed forces into the territory of the Chechen Republic on 11 December 1994.

According to the applicants, the decrees actually declared a state of emergency in Chechnya and caused massive violations of the constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens.

The Constitutional Court declared Yeltsin's decree "On Measures to Suppress the Activities of Illegal Armed Groups on the Territory of the Chechen Republic and in the Zone of the Ossetian-Ingush Conflict" constitutional, ceasing to check other decrees. Thus, in the case of the secret decree "On measures to restore constitutional law and order on the territory of the Chechen Republic", the fact that at the time of the consideration of the case by the Constitutional Court it had already lost its force, worked.

Even during open hearings, the "Kommersant" newspaper noted that "on the sidelines of the house on Ilyinka [before moving from Moscow to St. Petersburg, the Constitutional Court was located there] almost no one hides the outcome - the decision will be in favor of the president." His representatives in court insisted that the use of force in Chechnya was justified and comparable to the threat to Russia's security posed by the regime operating in the republic at that time.

As a result, the Constitutional Court declared only two provisions from the government decree unconstitutional - on the expulsion of persons who pose a threat to public safety and personal security of citizens from the Chechen Republic, as well as on the deprivation of accreditation of journalists working in the zone of armed conflict.

Almost half of the judges of the Constitutional Court expressed dissenting opinions on the case.

Ernest Ametistov did not agree with the procedure for refusing to consider Boris Yeltsin's secret decree, but at the same time he generally supported the decision of the Constitutional Court. Nikolai Vitruk did not agree that Boris Yeltsin had the right to transfer exclusive powers to use all the means available to the state "to ensure state security, the rule of law, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the protection of public order, the fight against crime, the disarmament of all illegal armed formations" government, as this is contrary to the principle of separation of powers.

Most of the judges, including Anatoly Kononov and Gadis Gadzhiev, did not agree, in particular, with the wording about the possibility of using "all available means". Thus, Kononov noted that this violated the basic principle of international norms, according to which "the rights of the conflicting parties to choose the methods and means of waging war are not unlimited." "If we agree that the Decrees of the President and the Decree of the Government comply with the Constitution, there is another question that arises: what is the Constitution itself, on the basis of which decisions can be made that open the way to war with one's own people?" – wrote Viktor Luchin.

Valery Zorkin also did not agree with the general decision. Later, in an interview with "Kommersant", he stated that the judges had no information about the emergency nature of the situation in Chechnya that would motivate immediate intervention: "Besides, nothing prevented Yeltsin from turning to the Federation Council anyway. Here, the facts of the attack and casualties were confirmed not only by the Russian side, but also by American agencies, which referred to US satellite intelligence. I believe that in conditions where the state has irrefutable evidence of the conduct of hostilities that can lead to the mass death of its compatriots, it has the right to use the concept of peace enforcement."

Not everyone was satisfied with the termination of proceedings to verify Yeltsin's secret decree - some of the judges insisted that the Constitutional Court had all the powers to evaluate the issued document.

The former assistant to the representative of "Aeroflot" in Zimbabwe, Vladimir Gurzhiyants, was accused of "treason" (Art. 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR). According to the Chief Military Prosecutor's Office, during 1992-1993, Vladimir Gurzhiyants handed over to the Zimbabwean intelligence agents of the Russian special services, who worked under the guise of official representations. In the spring of 1995, the military court of the Moscow Military District sentenced Gurzhiyants to 8 years of strict regime with confiscation of property.

At that time, the Constitutional Court had already agreed to hear the Gurzhiyants's case – his lawyer Dmitry Shteinberg was not allowed to meet with his client and get acquainted with the case materials. The applicant was thus defended by another lawyer, who was appointed by the Federal Counterintelligence Service.

The basis for such a refusal was the absence of a special access to state secrets by the defender in the prescribed form, provided for in Art. 21 of the Law "On State Secrets". The court pointed out that according to Art. 1 of the same law, its provisions are binding on the territory of Russia and abroad by representative, executive and judicial authorities, as well as officials and citizens.

Believing that his constitutional right to receive qualified legal assistance, including the assistance of a chosen lawyer, was violated, Vladimir Gurzhiyants appealed to the Constitutional Court with a complaint about the constitutionality of these legal norms. Complaints with similar demands were received from several more people - Vadim Sintsov, Director for Foreign Economic Relations of JSC "Special Engineering and Metallurgy", Valery Bugrov, and environmentalist Alexander Nikitin. Their cases were combined into one.

The Constitutional Court recalled that the Constitution guarantees everyone the right to freely seek, receive, transmit, produce and disseminate information in any legal way. But at the same time, its text stipulates that the federal law may contain a list of information constituting a state secret (Part 4 of Art. 29). Based on this, the legislator has the right not only to establish this list, but also to determine the procedure for access to the information indicated in it. Art. 1 of the Law on State Secrets does not contradict the Constitution.

However, the court noted that the procedure for access to classified information, established by the Law on State Secrets, does not exclude access to them by people with a special legal status. For example, deputies of the Federation Council or judges. The opposite would be contrary to the nature of their constitutional status, the peculiarities of holding office and the functions they perform. At the same time, the safety of state secrets in such cases is guaranteed by various liability mechanisms.

The court also recalled that the lawyer is a participant in the process of criminal cases, the procedure for which is determined by the Code of Criminal Procedure of the RSFSR. This procedure is unified and obligatory in all criminal cases and for all courts, as well as prosecution, preliminary investigation and inquiry bodies. At the same time, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court clarified, does not contain requirements for any preliminary verification of a lawyer and special permission to participate in cases.

In this regard, the Constitutional Court concluded that the challenged provision on the procedure for access to state secrets cannot be applied to a lawyer participating in criminal proceedings as a defense counsel. The court referred to the fact that the Constitution of the Russian Federation, international legal acts on human rights and federal laws require from the state adequate guarantees for the protection of the rights and freedoms of people involved in criminal proceedings. For example, Art. 48 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees the right of everyone to qualified legal assistance, including a lawyer at all stages of criminal prosecution.

According to Art. 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is an integral part of the legal system of Russia, every citizen, when considering the charges against him, has the right to defend himself with the help of a lawyer chosen by him.

The Constitutional Court decided that the refusal to the accused or suspected to retain a lawyer of his choice due to his lack of access to state secrets, as well as the proposal to choose a lawyer from a certain circle of lawyers with such access, are unlawful. This also contradicts the principle of competitiveness and equality of the parties in court, enshrined in Part 3 of Art. 123 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The Constitutional Court also drew attention to the fact that the legislation contains enough mechanisms capable of preserving state secrets within the framework of judicial proceedings - they also exclude disproportionate restriction of human rights and freedoms. Examples of such mechanisms are, in particular, the warning of participants in the process of non-disclosure of state secrets that became known to them in connection with the proceedings in a criminal case, and bringing them to criminal responsibility in case of its disclosure. The preservation of state secrets in criminal proceedings, the Constitutional Court recalled, is also ensured by the provisions on professional secrecy in the legislation on the bar.

As a result, the Constitutional Court recognized Art. 1 and Art. 21 of the Law "On State Secrets" corresponding to the Constitution. However, to extend the provisions of Art. 21 on the defense attorneys, by court order, is illegal. The Constitutional Court decided to amend the legislation and review the applicants' cases.

Lawyers who work with those accused of treason still feel the positive effects of this ruling to this day, says lawyer Ivan Pavlov , who specializes in criminal cases involving state secrets.

"This is a revolutionary decision. And I am very proud that I had something to do with him - although I personally did not participate [in this process], my mentor Yuri Schmidt, with whom I worked together on the Alexander Nikitin case, did. The work, of course, was carried out jointly," says Pavlov. "And I consider myself involved in this decision, one of the few that can be called revolutionary.

Now there are no such decisions. In some of its further decisions in the early 2000s, the Constitutional Court even extended the scope of this ruling beyond the scope of criminal cases. And he said that for the participation of lawyers in cases that are related to state secrets in the framework of arbitration, civil, legal proceedings, it is also enough to use a non-disclosure agreement for information constituting a state secret, and thereby allow them to participate in the case and familiarize themselves with the materials. Because the right to judicial protection prevails over other rights and obligations that are associated with the circulation of information constituting a state secret.

But still, the March 1996 judgement was the first step. What was the background? They did not want to allow us to participate in the case of Alexander Nikitin. The investigators said that if we had a permit, they would let us in. They offered the client to choose a lawyer with a security clearance, usually from former security officials who still had security clearance after their dismissal. In Soviet times, there was such a practice when only "special" lawyers were admitted to a certain category of cases. And when an ordinary lawyer came to the investigator, he was told this: "Of course, we will allow you, but let the chairman of the presidium of the Bar Association sign this warrant." But the chairman never signed such a permit. And this rule has flowed from the Soviet to Russian times. And since there were more colleges, the security agencies simply refused, citing a lack of access.

Art. 21 of the Law on State Secrets clearly stated that permission was needed. And this was just the reason - several applicants applied to the Constitutional Court at once, and the Constitutional Court then made this decision.

If you look, last year we tried to recognize the right of a lawyer without lawyer status to participate in such cases under the Code of Administrative Procedure. And the Court has already departed from the position it has taken in a number of its other judgments. He said: "No, after all, not all lawyers, but only attorneys, have the right." Although earlier in its rulings the Court spoke not only about attorneys, but about all participants in a particular legal proceeding."

On the question of how the right to defense, the completeness of the examination of evidence and state secrets are combined today in the framework of a judicial investigation, commented Tamara Morshchakova, Professor at the National Research University Higher School of Economics:

"There can be no secrets from the court. The existence of state secrets from the court, which excludes the possibility of examining any documents, would be contrary to the fullness of the judiciary. And the protection of state secrets in the procedural sense, in the order of legal proceedings, is provided by other methods: a closed meeting, obligations not to disclose the secret, which are imposed on the participants in the process.

Now, in general, they come to the court and say: "We will not tell you why we are expelling this person, but we declare this organization undesirable, because security interests require us not to disclose it."

There can be no security interests that require something not to be disclosed in front of a court."

On November 26, 1996, at the initiative of a group of State Duma deputies, amendments were adopted to the Law "On the State Border of the Russian Federation", according to which a fee was introduced for border processing of documents. Specific rates were set for each type of movement of goods, persons across the border, as well as for the inspection of goods and vehicles.

"After the law came into force, a number of subjects of the right to legislative initiative (primarily the heads of administrations and legislative bodies of the border regions, in particular the Murmansk, Arkhangelsk, Kaliningrad regions, Primorsky, Khabarovsk Territories), expressed disagreement both with the amount of fees and with the essence of the law," wrote RAPSI.

In January 1997, the Governor of the Khabarovsk Territory, Viktor Ishaev, applied to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation with a request to verify the constitutionality of Art. 11.1 of this law, taking into account the amendments.

The first part of the disputed article provided for the introduction of a fee for clearance at border control, and the second part determined the amount of the fee charged from persons crossing the state border, from owners of vehicles and cargo for inspection, and also established that the procedure for collecting the fee should be determined by the Government of the Russian Federation. However, as noted by the Constitutional Court, the relevant acts were not issued by the Government of the Russian Federation, therefore, in fact, no fee was charged for border clearance.

On July 19, 1997, Art. 11.1 of the State Border Law was again amended. The new version of the second part of the article already said that not only the procedure for collection, but also the amount of the fee for border clearance, as well as the categories of persons exempted from paying the specified fee, will now be established by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Then Ishaev sent a second request to the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation clarifying his position. According to the governor, the introduction of a border clearance fee is an unacceptable restriction of the constitutional rights of everyone to freedom of travel outside the Russian Federation and unhindered return, does not comply with international law and a number of international treaties of the Russian Federation, and violates the guarantees of freedom of economic activity. In addition, Ishaev said, the federal tax, including its integral elements such as the tax base, rates and benefits, can only be established by federal law, and the legislator is not entitled to delegate this authority to the government.

The CC reasoned that the border clearance fee is indeed, in fact, a tax payment: it is a mandatory fee for public authorities, which goes to a special budget fund. And the establishment of taxes, including all their essential elements (tax source, tax rate, payment deadlines, etc.), belongs to the powers of the federal legislature.

In the disputed article of the law, the establishment of these elements was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Government of the Russian Federation. This may lead to the fact that tax liabilities "may be changed for the worse for the taxpayer in a simplified manner" by the executive branch, the Constitutional Court emphasized in its judgment.

As a result, the Constitutional Court recognized that only those provisions of the second part of Art. 11.1 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On the State Border of the Russian Federation", referring specifically to the establishment by the Government of the Russian Federation of the amount of the fee for border clearance, as well as the categories of persons exempted from payment of this fee, are inconsistent with Art. 57 of the Russian Constitution.

Two judges of the Constitutional Court expressed dissenting opinions on this case.

Thus, Anatoly Kononov pointed out that the Constitutional Court assessed the disputed article of the Law "On the State Border of the Russian Federation" only from the point of view of the principle of delimitation of competence between federal state authorities and actually refused to look at the norm in terms of content. In addition, in the opinion of the judge, no substantive arguments were brought forward to refute the applicant's arguments in the case.

Kononov emphasized that at the court session, none of the interviewed officials could explain what the term "border clearance" meant in terms of content, therefore, the introduction of the fee was not due to the provision of any special services or benefits to payers, which means "not accompanied by a comparison of the payment with any costs or labor costs of the border service. He added that the entire border clearance fee should go to the income of the Development Fund of the Federal Border Service. "Such a way of forming the financial base of government bodies is nothing more than the commercialization of their activities," Kononov said.

The judge considered that since the border clearance fee is essentially identical to the customs duty, its introduction gives rise to double taxation, and therefore does not comply with constitutional principles.

Moreover, Kononov stressed that the collection of such a fee when crossing the state border not only from individuals, but also from owners of vehicles and cargo is contrary to a number of international agreements with the participation of the Russian Federation on air traffic, on road, sea and rail transportation. And, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation, these agreements take precedence over federal legislation.

Judge Nikolai Vitruk, in turn, decided that since both parts of the disputed article are "inseparable unity", it is illogical to give them different constitutional and legal qualifications. The first part of the article of the law does not establish essential elements mandatory for the federal tax, which means that this norm is fiction, he reasoned. "The law recognizes as existing something that does not actually exist, and such a norm cannot be recognized as corresponding (or not contradicting) to the Constitution of the Russian Federation," Vitruk explained.

In December 1997, already taking into account the decision of the Constitutional Court, a group of deputies of the State Duma submitted for consideration a new draft amendment to the Law on the State Border. It indicated specific rates for the processing of border documents, exit and entry visas, movement of goods, etc.

At the same time, the State Duma received several bills at once - from the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Karelia, member of the Federation Council Viktor Stepanov and the Murmansk Regional Duma - which raised the question of excluding the border tax. However, in the spring of 1998, the State Duma adopted amendments on the introduction of the fee in the first reading, rejecting alternative options.

In June 1998, the deputies adopted the bill in the second and third readings. That same summer, amendments to the law were approved by the Federation Council and signed by the president.

Two years later, the State Duma adopted the law "On the Enactment of Part Two of the Tax Code of the Russian Federation", by which the amendment on the introduction of the border fee was declared invalid from January 1, 2001.

The reason for the consideration of the case was the requests of the Karelian Legislative Assembly and the State Council of the Komi Republic on the interpretation of Art. 125, 126 and 127 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The applicants noted that these provisions introduce uncertainty into the scope of the competence of the courts - they allow them to recognize laws and other regulations as unconstitutional - and as a result, not valid. The applicants considered that such review of the laws could only be carried out by the Constitutional Court.

The Constitutional Court had to find out whether the powers of the courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts follow from the provisions of the Constitution to check the laws for constitutionality and recognize them as invalid.

The Constitutional Court recalled that Art. 125 of the Constitution assigns it to him to check the normative acts for compliance with the main law of the country, after which they may be invalidated. We are talking about resolving cases on the constitutionality of federal laws, regulations of the President of the Russian Federation, the Federation Council, the State Duma, the Government of the Russian Federation, the constitutions of the republics, charters of territories and regions, as well as laws and other regulations of Russian subjects issued on issues of state power.

The Court emphasized that other judicial bodies do not have such powers. But if a court of general jurisdiction or an arbitration court comes to the conclusion that a federal or regional law is unconstitutional, then it is obliged to apply to the Constitutional Court with a request to conduct such a check.

At the same time, as the Constitutional Court pointed out, Art. 125, 126 and 127 of the Constitution do not deprive the courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts (outside of the consideration of a specific case) of the opportunity to check normative acts at a level lower than the federal law for compliance with an act that has greater legal force (except constitution). Such powers of the courts can be established and consolidated by federal constitutional law.

According to Judge Nikolai Vitruk, when interpreting Art. 125, 126 and 127 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court did not take into account "the difference between the categories of constitutionality and legality". He drew attention to the fact that the verification of constitutionality is carried out at two levels of the courts - federal and the level of constituent entities. The ruling of the Constitutional Court, according to the judge, does not provide a clear answer to the question of which courts can check for compliance with the Constitution and, therefore, invalidate the normative acts of ministries, departments and others.

Judge Vitruk believed that the legality of normative acts (that is, for compliance with an act of greater legal force than the Constitution) can be carried out by courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts not only when considering specific cases (clause 3 of Art. 5 of the Federal Law "On judicial system of the Russian Federation"), but also in the order of normative control.

The starting point in resolving questions about the powers of courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts to check normative acts for compliance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the constitutions (charters) of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, as well as for the compliance of by-laws with acts of greater legal force in the procedure of normative control should be the constitutional provisions on the right of citizens to judicial protection.

"There should not be such a legal situation in which a citizen could not raise the issue of repealing an unconstitutional or illegal regulatory act (of a federal or a constituent entity of the Russian Federation) in court," Judge Vitruk said in his dissenting opinion.

Gadis Gadzhiev expressed the opinion that when interpreting Art. 125 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court did not take into account its own legal position, formulated in a number of previous decisions on the inadmissibility of accepting requests for interpretation of constitutional provisions specified in the current legislation. In such cases, as the judge pointed out, under the guise of an interpretation for constitutionality, norms unconstitutionality of which has not been questioned by the applicant, are being checked.

Gadis Gadzhiev drew attention to the decision of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of October 31, 1995 N 8 "On some issues of the application of the Constitution of the Russian Federation by the courts in the administration of justice", which explained that the courts, based on the provisions of Part 4 of Art. 125 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, may (but are not required) to apply to the Constitutional Court.

Thus, the judge pointed to the dispute on jurisdiction between the Plenum of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, the resolution of which by one of the participants, who are clearly interested in this, violates Art. 93 of the Federal Law on the Constitutional Court and the general legal principle enshrined in it "no one can be a judge in his own case."

The judge also pointed out that citizens of Russia cannot be limited in challenging the laws of the subjects of the Russian Federation by the interpretation of Art. 125 of the Constitution, which, in his opinion, limits the right to judicial protection. Gadis Gadzhiev argues that such a restriction of constitutional rights is possible only through the adoption of a federal law, and not through interpretation by the Constitutional Court.

According to the judge, the interpretation cannot result in limiting the powers of courts of general jurisdiction and arbitration courts to verify (in the manner of administrative proceedings) the constitutionality of normative acts of ministries and departments of the federal and regional levels. According to Gadis Gadzhiev, the courts are not only entitled, but also obliged to recognize such by-laws as unconstitutional and invalid on the basis of complaints from individuals - "in the manner of direct application of the constitutional provision on the right to judicial protection."

"The conclusions of the courts (in particular, the higher courts) on the contradiction of the norm of the law of the Constitution of the Russian Federation do not mean that it has become invalid. However, such court decisions represent the emergence of judicial law, the development of which is extremely necessary for the Russian legal system in order to overcome positivist approaches," the judge wrote.

"Some theorists misinterpret the decision of the Constitutional Court, stating that the Constitutional Court denied that the courts checked the norms from the point of view of their compliance with the Constitution, and interpret this as a ban on judicial control over the content of the norm in specific cases," said Tamara Morshchakova, a retired judge of the Constitutional Court. "At the same time, the Constitutional Court indicated that any court can apply only the law that is consistent with the Constitution. But any court cannot invalidate an unconstitutional norm. The decision emphasizes that any court can set it aside and, on the basis of other norms and general legal principles, decide the case.

But even when the court resolves the case, it must still apply to the Constitutional Court so that the Constitutional Court confirms the assessment of the norm that is not applied in a particular case as unconstitutional. That is, the courts were required to write a mandatory request to the Constitutional Court to invalidate the law that they considered inapplicable as unconstitutional."

The State Duma addressed the Constitutional Court with a request to clarify the terms of Boris Yeltsin's tenure as president. The draft appeal was prepared by deputies Elena Mizulina, Alexei Zakharov and Adrian Puzanovsky. An appeal to the Constitutional Court was required by the wording that the same person cannot hold the presidency for more than two consecutive terms.

Boris Yeltsin was first elected to a five-year presidential term on June 12, 1991, under the old Constitution of the RSFSR, which ceased to operate in 1993. The new Russian Constitution introduced a rule on limiting the powers of the head of state to two consecutive terms. The uncertainty with which the deputies turned to the Constitutional Court was whether it was necessary to count the time of Boris Yeltsin's rule from 1991 to 1995 when determining the possibility of re-election for a third time. Yeltsin himself said that he would not go to the 2000 elections, but the statements of his press secretary about the legitimacy of the very fact of participating in the elections cast doubt on the president's plans.

The Constitutional Court determined Boris Yeltsin's presidency from 1996 to 2000 as a second term, which barred him from running in the upcoming elections. Among the law enforcement decisions confirming this logic, the Constitutional Court cited the appointment by the Federation Council of elections for June 16, 1996 with unequivocal wording, implying that "the first constitutional term of office of the President of the Russian Federation has expired." All the documents, according to the Constitutional Court, indicated that the incumbent president before the elections was considered "as a candidate for this position for a second term": "These decisions were not questioned and were not disputed, including neither by himself nor by other candidates", says the decision.

A dissenting opinion on the case was expressed by Judge Tamara Morshchakova, who considered that the dispute over the terms of Boris Yeltsin should have been resolved not by the Constitutional Court, but by law enforcers - the Central Election Commission, and in case of disagreement of the parties with its decision - the Supreme Court.

"Consideration by the Constitutional Court of the issue raised by the State Duma before and instead of law enforcement officers who would have to resolve the indicated hypothetical situation, if it arose at all, is an interference in such a law enforcement process and is contrary to the idea of direct action of the Constitution of the Russian Federation," the dissenting opinion says. According to Tamara Morshchakova, the Constitutional Court did not have sufficient grounds either to submit the request of the State Duma for consideration, or to deepen the assessment of these legal issues in the procedure of constitutional proceedings, and even more so to decide on its merits in the ruling on termination of the proceedings.

In addition to banning Boris Yeltsin's participation in the 2000 elections, the decision of the Constitutional Court confirmed the possibility of the president being elected for more terms if they do not follow one another. Vladimir Putin, who in 2008 ceded the post of head of state to Dmitry Medvedev, was able to take advantage of this opportunity.

On March 10, 2020, State Duma deputy from "Edinaya Rossiya" Valentina Tereshkova proposed, after the adoption of amendments to the Constitution, to "zero out" the presidential terms and give the incumbent President Vladimir Putin the right, "like any citizen," to be elected again. The amendment caused a wide response and provoked many comparisons with the situation of Boris Yeltsin in 1998.

Pavel Krasheninnikov, one of the co-chairs of the working group on the preparation of amendments to the 2020 Constitution, the State Duma Committee on State Construction and Legislation, stated that such a comparison is incorrect, since in 1998 the Constitutional Court only indicated by its decision: there is no ambiguity in understanding that Boris Yeltsin holds his position second term in a row.

The "Yabloko" faction in the Constitutional Court was represented by Elena Mizulina, who said that consideration of the issue of presidential terms is "important as a precedent": "If we leave in the current Constitution the norm under which it is possible to stay president for more than two consecutive terms, we will get a dictatorship. And after the dictatorship, as world experience shows, a revolutionary situation follows." Almost 22 years later, her position has changed. "We have the strongest president, who is feared all over the world and reckoned with," Elena Mizulina said at a meeting of the Federation Council, supporting the proposal to "zero out" presidential terms in the spring of 2020.

The Constitutional Court, more than 20 years later, also found no common ground between the situations that developed with Boris Yeltsin and Vladimir Putin. Assessing the amendment to zero out presidential terms in 2020, the Constitutional Court clarified that the resolution of the issue of the maximum number of presidential terms is due to the balance of constitutional values, and the all-Russian vote for the amendments, which took place in the summer of 2020, should have given additional legitimacy to the process.

In February 1996, citizen O. Veselyashkina entered into a term bank deposit agreement with the Meshchansky branch of Sberbank of Russia, which provided for an interest rate on the deposit of 4.5% per month. Due to the fact that since March 1996 the Savings Bank of Russia unilaterally lowered the rate, the applicant filed a lawsuit against this bank with the Istrinsky District Court of the Moscow Region, the consideration of which, after the applicant's application to the RF Constitutional Court, was suspended.

In March 1997, O. Veselyashkina and A. Veselyashkin entered into a term bank deposit agreement "Moscow - 850 years" with a branch of the joint-stock bank "Inkombank", according to which the interest rate on the deposit was 31.2% per annum. During the year, the bank unilaterally reduced the interest rate on the deposit twice. The Krasnogorsk District Court of the Moscow Region, where the depositors applied with a demand to recognize the terms of the agreement as invalid and recover the losses incurred, refused to satisfy the claims. The court referred to Part 2 of Art. 29 of the Federal Law "On banks and banking activities".

The same situation developed with N. Lazarenko. In February 1996, he entered into two term deposit agreements with the Sokolniki branch of the Savings Bank of Russia with an interest rate of 90% per annum. The Bank during the term of the agreements repeatedly unilaterally reduced this rate. The Preobrazhenskiy Inter-Municipal Court of Moscow, to which the applicant applied, dismissed his claims similar to Veselashkin's, citing the same provision of law. The Judicial Collegium of the Moscow City Court upheld this decision.

In their complaints to the Constitutional Court, the applicants asked to verify the constitutionality of this norm of the federal law. In their opinion, its provision, which allows the bank, on the basis of an agreement, to unilaterally reduce interest rates on fixed-term deposits of citizens, infringes on their constitutional rights. The Constitutional Court joined the cases on these complaints in one proceeding.

In its decision, the Constitutional Court found that, in accordance with Part 2 of Art. 29 of the Law "On Banks and Banking Activities", a credit institution does not have the right to unilaterally change interest rates on loans, except as provided by federal law or an agreement with a client.

The Court recalled that by the time the Contested Norm came into force Part 1 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation was already in force, in accordance with Art. 310 of which unilateral refusal to fulfill an obligation and unilateral change in its conditions (if this is not related to the implementation of entrepreneurial activity) are not allowed, except as provided by law. In addition, Art. 838 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, it was directly established that the amount of the interest rate under a term bank deposit agreement with a citizen cannot be unilaterally reduced by a bank, unless otherwise provided by law.

Meanwhile, in practice, in the presence of this conflict of norms, the banks continued to apply the disputed provision and interpreted it as not requiring additional specification. As a result, banks reduced rates on such deposits, which was not rejected by the courts either.

Having considered the case, the Constitutional Court recognized the norm of the law "On Banks and Banking Activity", which provides for an arbitrary reduction by banks of the interest rate on fixed-term deposits of citizens, unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court pointed out that the bank is not entitled to establish such a condition in the contract without defining in the federal law the grounds that give it such an opportunity.

Almost a quarter of a century has passed since the adoption of this judgment, but the problem of consumer insecurity in relations with banks cannot be called completely resolved. Banking organizations still continue to include provisions in contracts on the possibility of unilaterally changing the conditions for the provision of their services, and consumers are forced to sign them - they have no tools to protect their rights, in addition to judicial ones.

Two years ago, the Supreme Court was again forced to prohibit unilateral changes in the terms of contracts that worsen the position of the depositor - this time it was about bonus conditions. The Supreme Court, referring to the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of 1999, emphasizes: "…a citizen is an economically weak party and needs special protection of his rights, which entails the need to limit the freedom of contract for the other party, that is, for banks."

At the same time, the rule on the illegality of unilateral changes to the provisions of a standard contract, which the consumer does not have the possibility of making amendments to, already applies not only to deposits, but also to other banking services: for example, the conditions for providing premium customer service programs.

An example of this is the decision of the Supreme Court of 2021, in which the Supreme Court pointed out the inadmissibility of a unilateral change in the terms of the contract by a financial organization, even if the citizen agreed to this by signing the document. A detailed description of this case (about the changed conditions for banks to provide access to business lounges at airports) was published by "Advokatskaya Gazeta".

In a commentary for "AG", Dmitry Boholdin, a lawyer at Borodin & Partners, noted that the courts in Russia still continue to form a practice on the issue of the impossibility for one party, professionally engaged in entrepreneurial activities, to unilaterally waive its obligations when concluding an agreement with a citizen who is not an entrepreneur.